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MUNICIPAL STATE ACTION ANTITRUST IMMUNITY: A
FEDERALISM ARGUMENT AGAINST THE BAD
FAITH EXCEPTION
INTRODUCTION
In the law of antitrust, the state action doctrine immunizes states
against claims that they have violated the federal antitrust laws.' This
immunity, however, is not available exclusively to the states. Bodies
other than states also may restrain trade and claim state action antitrustimmunity to the extent that they have acted pursuant to state-granted
authority to displace competition with regulation.2
Accordingly, municipalities or private parties regulated by the state
that satisfy the criteria of the state action doctrine cannot be held liable
for enacting or administering legislation in restraint of trade The law
remains unsettled, however, whether evidence of a bad faith motivation
on the part of local officials vitiates the municipality's state action immu-
nity:4 can a municipality that satisfies the state action criteria neverthe-
less lose that protection if it is found that its officials used their state-
granted power to regulate in "bad faith"? This Note argues that the an-
swer to this question is no. The intent of municipal officials is irrelevant
to state action immunity analysis because the principles of federalism,
not the subjective motivations of individuals, determine whether a mu-
nicipality is immune.
Part I of this Note briefly summarizes the current standard of munici-
pal state action immunity, and identifies the lines of cases for and against
finding a bad faith exception to municipal state action immunity. Part H
explains why courts should not consider the good or bad faith of individ-
ual local officials to determine immunity, and why the arguments in sup-
port of the bad faith exception are inadequate. This Note concludes that
no bad faith exception to municipal state action immunity should exist.
1. See infra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
4. Compare Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1987) (motives of
public decisionmakers irrelevant to determination of state action immunity) and City
Communications, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 650 F. Supp. 1570 (F.D. Mich. 1987) (same)
and Traweek v. City and County of San Francisco, 659 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(same) with Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.
1982) (conspiracies to injure private competitor involving municipal officials not state
action immune), cert denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983) and Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st
Cir. 1981) (same) and Fisichelli v. Town of Methuen, 653 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Mass. 1987)
(same); see also infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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I. MUNICIPAL STATE ACTION IMMUNITY AND THE
PROBLEM OF BAD FAITH
A. State Action Immunity of Municipalities
The antitrust laws promote free market competition5 by prohibiting
unreasonable restraints of trade.6 The passage of the Sherman Antitrust
Act7 in 1890 symbolized a fundamental commitment by the nation to
"unfettered competition" in the marketplace.' A basic tension exists,
however, between the goal of antitrust laws-unfettered competition-
and the non-economic reasons for some state regulation of economic ac-
tivity: "[c]ompetition simply does not and cannot further the interests
that lie behind most social welfare legislation." 9 In 1943, the United
States Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Parker v. Brown,10 which
holds states acting as sovereigns immune from antitrust attack."1
In Parker, the Supreme Court found that Congress, in enacting the
5. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 406-07
(1978) (plurality opinion). The term "competition" eludes definition. See R. Bork, The
Antitrust Paradox 58 (1978). Judge Bork, however, defines competition in the context of
antitrust enforcement as "a shorthand expression ... designating any state of affairs in
which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an alternative state of affairs
through judicial decree." See id. at 61. For a summary of other views, see id. at 58-61; P.
Areeda & D. Turner, 2 Antitrust Law 1 402 (1978).
6. Restraints of trade are adjudged according to the "rule of reason," which
considers
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable[;] [t]he history of the restraint[;] the evil believed to
existL;] the reason for adopting the particular remedy[ and] the purpose or end
sought to be attained ....
Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). For a more recent
view of the rule of reason, see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
7. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combi-
nation.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade," 15 U.S.C. § 1, and § 2 prohibits monopo-
lization and attempts or conspiracies to monopolize trade. See id. § 2.
8. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); accord Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 61 (1985); City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 406-07 (1978) (plurality opin-
ion); I E. Kintner, Federal Antitrust Law § 4.1 (1980). See generally id. at ch. 4passim
(outlining Sherman Act's legislative history).
9. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 66 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After La-
fayette, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 435, 439 (1981); Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of
Federalism, 26 J. Law & Econ. 23, 23 (1983).
On the state and local levels, federal "antitrust laws, which are intended to promote
competition, have inevitably collided with state and local laws that have a tendency to
displace competition." H.R. Rep. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4602, 4609; see Easterbrook, supra, at 24. The state action
doctrine attempts to reconcile these conflicts with the principles of federalism. See South-
ern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 61 (1985).
10. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
11. Id at 350-52.
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Sherman Antitrust Act, demonstrated no intention of applying the stat-
ute to states acting as sovereigns. 12 The rule of Parker, known as the
state action doctrine,' 3 immunizes state actions that would restrain trade
in violation of the federal antitrust laws. 4 To hold otherwise would
mean that any time a state attempted to regulate the free market by en-
acting laws that restrain competition, the antitrust laws would preempt
the state's actions. 5 This conclusion not only would eliminate the states'
police power to regulate,' 6 but also would contradict the principles of
federalism upon which our republic is based.' 7
12. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943). Parker involved a suit by a
private raisin producer seeking to enjoin a raisin marketing program adopted by the State
of California. Ia at 344. The plaintiff alleged that the program prohibited him from
selling his raisins on the free market. Id at 349. Recognizing the anticompetitive impli-
cations of the program, id at 350, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act was not
intended to restrain a state from regulating its own domestic commerce. Id at 352.
13. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 270 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)
(citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471
U.S. 34, 38 (1985).
14. See Hallie, 471 U.S. at 44 n.7; Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52; Easterbrook, supra note
, at 24-25.
15. See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 24; cf Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S.
654, 659 (1982) (Sherman Act does not preempt state regulation that has anticompetitive
effects or that would violate the antitrust laws if engaged in by private parties).
The Justices of the Supreme Court have debated at length whether the state action
doctrine constitutes an implied exemption from the federal antitrust laws, or a limit to
federal preemption of state law. Compare Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference,
Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 55 n.18 (1985) (state action doctrine an implied exemp-
tion to which Congress has acquiesced for 40 years) and Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53-54 (1982) (state action doctrine an "exemption")
with id at 63 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Parker Court holding "clearly [invokes] the
language of federal pre-emption") and City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389, 393 n.8 (1978) (finding a reference to state action doctrine as an "exemp-
tion" merely a "shorthand" indication that Congress did not intend to prohibit anticom-
petitive state laws). The Court, however, now appears to draw a distinction between the
issues of federal preemption and state action immunity. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley,
475 U.S. 260, 264, 270 (1986) (Court, in dismissing antitrust claim against city, did not
reach issue of state action immunity because city's anticompetitive actions not preempted
by federal law). The Fisher holding thus suggests that the state action doctrine is an
exemption from antitrust liability. For excellent analyses of the different views, see Boul-
der, 455 U.S. at 61-65 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Law 209.1 (Supp. 1987).
16. See New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110-11 (1978);
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978). The Constitution
grants the states "police power" to regulate matters of "legitimate local concern," Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (citing Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447
U.S. 27, 36 (1980)), such as public health and welfare, see City of Newport v. lacobucci,
107 S. Ct. 383, 385 (1986) (per curiam) (quoting California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114
(1972)); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) (citing
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1873)). In exercising their police
power, states permissibly may affect areas of congressional concern, such as interstate
commerce. See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137-40 (explaining extent to which states may tread
on federal authority to regulate interstate commerce).
17. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415-16
(1978) (plurality opinion); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943); cf Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982) ("Parker recognized
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For thirty years, the Supreme Court "largely ignored" the state action
doctrine.' 8 Then, beginning in 1975, the doctrine became a regular topic
of consideration for the Court.1 9 The majority2 ° of these contemporary
cases deals with the problem caused by nonsovereign bodies, such as mu-
nicipalities2 and private parties,22 that restrain trade pursuant to a state
program authorizing displacement of competition. Without nonsover-
eign bodies, a state would be unable to regulate commerce effectively.23
Because they are not sovereign, however, these bodies cannot claim that
the principles of federalism protect them. As a result, the Supreme Court
extended the state action doctrine to nonsovereign bodies24 to the extent
that they act "pursuant to [a] state policy to displace competition with
regulation or monopoly public service."2z5 This standard, moreover, re-
Congress' intention to limit the state-action exemption based upon the federalism princi-
ple of limited state sovereignty").
18. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Pro-
cess, 96 Yale L.J. 486, 488 (1987); see H.R. Rep. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4602, 4606-07 (suggesting that the
reason for the Court's renewed interest in the Parker doctrine was a general displeasure
with threshold dismissal doctrines).
19. State sovereignty comprises the actions of the state legislature, see Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943), and the state supreme court. See Hoover v.
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984). The Supreme Court, however, has not determined
whether state sovereignty also includes the executive. See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568 n.17.
But cf Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 745 F.2d 1281, 1282-83 (9th
Cir. 1984) (state action doctrine extends to state executive), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053
(1985). Nevertheless, the Court expressly has concluded that state sovereignty does not
extend to municipalities. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38
(1985); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982)
(quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978)
(plurality opinion)); see also Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 265 (1986) ("The
ultimate source of [state action] immunity can be only the State, not its subdivisions.").
20. Three cases involve sovereign bodies, see Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 581
(1984) (state supreme court); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977)
(same); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975) (same), while six involve
non-sovereign entities, see infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
21. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 36 (1985); Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 43 (1982); City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 394 (1978) (plurality opinion).
22. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48,
50 (1985) (private rate-setting associations); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 99 (1980) (private wine wholesalers); Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 581 (1976) (private utility).
23. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64; Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51; id. at 67
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 434-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Scott v.
City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207, 1215 (8th Cir. 1984).
24. The first case to consider the state action immunity of municipalities was City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co, 435 U.S. 389, 412-15 (1978) (plurality opin-
ion). Although Lafayette was a plurality opinion, a majority of the Justices adopted the
Court's holdings in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (applying state action immunity to private parties), and in Com-
munity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982) (applying state
action immunity to municipalities).
25. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413; see Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34,
39 (1985); Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51.
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quires that the state policy be "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed." 26
Under this standard, a municipality seeking to assert a Parker defense
need not "point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization.""
Rather, the anticompetitive effects of the challenged municipal restraint
must constitute the kind of action contemplated by the state legislature28
and must be a foreseeable consequence of engaging in the authorized ac-
tivity.29 The state action doctrine immunizes from antitrust liability a
municipal restraint that meets these criteria.3"
26. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54 (citing Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413). Bodies other than
municipalities, such as private parties regulated by the state, must also show that the state
"actively supervise[s]" their conduct. California Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Alu-
minium, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410); see Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 58 (1985). Munici-
palities, however, need not satisfy this additional requirement. Town of Hallie v. City of
Ean Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985).
The lesser standard of state action immunity for municipalities reflects the fact that
unsupervised private parties would tend to favor self-interest over state policy, while mu-
nicipalities presumably act in the public interest. See Halie, 471 U.S. at 47. Moreover,
the requirement that a municipality be acting pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirm-
atively expressed state policy eliminates the "minimal" risk that a municipality will use
its regulatory authority to further "purely parochial public interests at the expense of
more overriding state goals." Id.
27. City of Lafayette v. Louisana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978) (plu-
rality opinion). To require otherwise would reflect "an unrealistic view of how legisla-
tures work and of how statutes are written." Haftie, 471 U.S. at 43. However, "the State
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct simply by declaring it to be
lawful." Id. at 39.
28. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (adopting standard applied by court of appeals in
City of Lafayette v. Louisana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
While mere "neutrality" on the part of a state legislature with respect to the anticompeti-
tive implications of municipal regulation does not meet this test, see Community Commu-
nications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1982) (broad grant of municipal
"home rule" power did not permit anticompetitive regulation of cable television by mu-
nicipality), it is satisfied if the anticompetitive effects of municipal regulation "logically
would result from ... [the] broad authority to regulate," Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42. A
municipality need not show that the state legislature compelled the activity complained
of. See id. at 45-46. Nor must a state legislature "state in a statute or its legislative
history that it intends for the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects." Id at 43.
29. See Hallie, 471 U.S. at 43. In Hallie, the state of Wisconsin delegated to the City
of Eau Claire the broad power to provide sewer service to unincorporated townships. Id.
at 41. The plaintiffs, a group of unincorporated townships, claimed that the city had
exceeded this authority by tying the provision of sewer services to the purchase of sewage
transport and collection services. Id at 36-37. The Hallie Court held that the state con-
templated anticompetitive behavior on the part of the municipality, and therefore, be-
cause the type of conduct complained of was a "foreseeable" result of the power granted,
the city had satisfied the criteria of the state action doctrine. Id at 42, 47.
30. See id at 44, 47. For recent decisions holding anticompetitive acts of municipali-
ties immune under the state action doctrine, see Campbell v. City of Chicago, 823 F.2d
1182, 1184-85 (7th Cir. 1987); Auton v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 1009, 1010 (1 th Cir. 1986);
Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1411-15 (9th Cir.
1985), aff'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
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B. The Problem of Bad Faith
Despite the extensive history of Supreme Court cases dealing with
state action antitrust immunity, some questions remain unanswered with
respect to municipalities.31 One unresolved issue is whether a local gov-
ernment that proves it has satisfied the requirements of state action im-
munity may lose that protection if its officials use their state-granted
power to regulate in bad faith.32
Although the cases that create the bad faith exception do not use the
term "bad faith,"33 an analysis of the pleadings in those cases shows that
the claim is invoked when the plaintiff alleges that municipal officials
used their state-granted regulatory power to serve their own financial in-
terests, or those of the plaintiff's competitor, by denying or revoking the
plaintiff's right to do business within the municipality. 34 The plaintiffs in
31. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 65 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (noting confusion over whether per se rules of antitrust illegal-
ity apply to municipalities in the same manner as to private defendants); Ross, Local
Governments and the Antitrust Laws after City of Eau Claire: Is the Fire Finally Out?, 15
Stetson L. Rev. 651, 655-56 (1986) (noting continued confusion); see also infra notes 37-
40 and accompanying text.
32. In a recent case, the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to con-
sider whether evidence of bad faith on the part of a nonsovereign body vitiates state
action immunity. See Patrick v. Burget, 56 U.S.L.W. 4430 (U.S. May 16, 1988). Because
the case involved a medical "peer review" board, however, the Court was able to deny
immunity solely upon the grounds that the state had failed to actively supervise the
board's actions. See id. at 4432. Thus, the Court did not consider the plaintiff's allega-
tion that the board had acted in bad faith. See id. at 4431 n.5.
33. The label "bad faith" seems to derive from the first case holding a nonsovereign
state body immune from antitrust liability despite an alleged bad faith action by a public
official. See Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1985) (chiropractor
pointed to trial court finding that medical director of state-sponsored fee-fixing program
had set high chiropractors' fees out of a dislike for chiropractors). Although Llewellyn
did not involve a claim against a municipality, it is often relied upon by courts refusing to
consider alleged bad faith conduct of municipal officials in state action immunity cases.
See, e.g., Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 1987); City Communi-
cations, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 650 F. Supp. 1570, 1577 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Traweek v.
City and County of San Francisco, 659 F. Supp. 1012, 1038-39 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (special
master's findings).
34. The most common claim of bad faith involves an alleged conspiracy between mu-
nicipal officials and a business competitor of the plaintiff that is designed to favor the co-
conspirators' business interests over those of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Westborough Mall,
Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 743 (8th Cir. 1982) (private developer
alleged city officials and competing developers conspired to revoke commercial zoning of
his land and then to grant development rights to competing developers), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 945 (1983); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1981) (unsuccessful bidder
claimed city awarded parking lot franchise to state-controlled Steamship Authority pur-
suant to a conspiracy to exclude plaintiff from the market); City Communications, Inc. v.
City of Detroit, 650 F. Supp. 1570, 1576 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (plaintiff alleged conspiracy
"to continually change the rules of the [cable television] franchise application process so
as to accommodate [plaintiff's competitor], and prevent plaintiff from competing fairly
for a franchise"); DiVerniero v. Murphy, 635 F. Supp. 1531, 1536 (D. Conn. 1986)
(plaintiff alleged city officials and exclusive vendor in city coliseum conspired to hire off-
duty police officers to harass street vendors in vicinity of coliseum). For other cases
involving conspiracy allegations, see Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784
476 [Vol. 56
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these cases argue that in doing so, local officials exceed their authority to
regulate and therefore fail to satisfy the "clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed"35 test of state action immunity.36
Courts faced with such claims have reached conflicting results. Since
the Supreme Court decision of Hoover v. Ronwin," which held that the
state action doctrine bars an antitrust plaintiff from challenging the mo-
tives of state officials,3" most cases have decided correctly that the intent
of municipal officials is irrelevant to municipal state action immunity
analysis.39 A minority of cases decided since Hoover, however, relies on
F.2d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 248 (1986); Whitworth V. Perkins, 559
F.2d 378, 379 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of Impact v. Whit-
worth, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated on remand, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 440
U.S. 911 (1979); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 585 (7th Cir.
1977), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated on remand, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir.
1978), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Oberndorf v. City and County of Denver, 653
F. Supp. 304, 309-10 (D. Colo. 1986); Schiessle v. Stephens, 525 F. Supp. 763, 769 (N.D.
Ili. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983); Mason City Center As-
socs. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 740-41 (N.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982). In one case, the plaintiff alleged that a municipal
official acted out of a bad faith desire to protect his own business interests. See Fisichelli
v. Town of Methuen, 653 F. Supp. 1494, 1501 (D. Mass. 1987) (town counsellor allegedly
denied issuance of industrial revenue bonds for a new shopping center to prevent compe-
tition with his and other pharmacies in town).
35. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982); ac-
cord City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (plural-
ity opinion); see also supra text accompanying note 26.
36. See, eg., Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 746
(8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park
Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 589-90 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992, rein-
stated on remand, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979);
Fisichelli v. Town of Methuen, 653 F. Supp. 1494, 1501 (D. Mass. 1987); City Communi-
cations, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 650 F. Supp. 1570, 1576 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
37. 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
38. See id. at 579-80; see also infra text accompanying notes 45-47.
39. See Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 1987); City Commu-
nications, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 650 F. Supp. 1570, 1576-78 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Traweek
v. City and County of San Francisco, 659 F. Supp. 1012, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (special
master's findings); Crocker v. Padnos, 483 F. Supp. 229, 232 (D. Mass. 1980); see also
Pendleton Constr. Corp. v. Rockbridge County, 837 F.2d 178, 179 (4th Cir. 1988) (court
does not consider allegation that municipality acted in concert with competitor of plain-
tiff in finding municipality state action immune); Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v.
Hope, 784 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding town state action immune despite allega-
tion that town conspired with plaintiff's competitor to prevent plaintiff from serving as
year-round air carrier at town airport), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 248 (1986); Hillman Fly-
ing Serv., Inc. v. City of Roanoke, 652 F. Supp. 1142, 114446 (W.D. Va. 1987) (finding
city state action immune despite allegation that it prevented plaintiff from selling fuel at
airport pursuant to illegal conspiracy with competitor of plaintiff), aff'd, No. 87-3037,
slip op. (4th Cir. Apr. 21, 1988); cf Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 828
F.2d 514, 522 (9th Cir. 1987) (ordinary error by municipal officials insufficient to vitiate
state action immunity); Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1985) (bad
faith motivation of director of state medical fee-setting agency irrelevant to state action
immunity analysis); Scott v. City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207, 1215 (8th Cir. 1984)
(mere label "conspiracy" not enough to strip municipality of state action immunity;
plaintiff also must allege municipal officials were engaged in "bribery or other illegal
acts"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
1987] 477
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an older (and incorrect) view that allegations of bad faith conduct by
municipal officials vitiate state action immunity.'4
While the cases upholding the bad faith exception do have an "intui-
tive appeal,"4 1 little in the way of substantive law exists to support them.
The doctrine of federalism, which provides the basis for the state action
doctrine,42 and the existence of other state and federal laws that may be
more appropriate to curb corruption in local government together dictate
that bad faith should not destroy municipal state action immunity.
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE BAD FAITH EXCEPTION:
FEDERALISM AND THE INAPPLICABILITY OF
ANTITRUST LAW
A. Federalism
The doctrine of federalism, with its emphasis on respect for state sov-
ereignty, mandates that allegations of bad faith on the part of municipal
officials should not destroy state action immunity.43 The bad faith excep-
tion conflicts with the tenets of federalism by calling for the intrusion of
federal courts into governmental decision-making on the state or local
level, and thus undermines the state action doctrine.44
40. The first case to suggest that bad faith conduct does not satisfy the requirements
of municipal state action immunity was Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557
F.2d 580, 591 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated on re-
mand, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979). For cases adopt-
ing a similar view, see Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733,
746 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 37 (1st
Cir. 1981); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. City of Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated on remand, 576
F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); Schiessle v. Stephens, 525 F.
Supp. 763, 776 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983);
Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029, at 76,330 (D. Colo.
1980); Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. at 76,330 (D.
Colo. 1980); Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 743 &
n.7 (N.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984)
apparently rejects this position, some cases decided subsequent to Hoover follow the bad
faith exception rule. See Fisichelli v. Town of Methuen, 653 F. Supp. 1494, 1500-01 (D.
Mass. 1987); Oberndorf v. City and County of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304, 309-10 (D.
Colo. 1986); DiVerniero v. Murphy, 635 F. Supp. 1531, 1537 (D. Conn. 1986).
For purposes of this Note, the unavailability of municipal state action immunity due to
bad faith on the part of municipal officials will be referred to as the "bad faith exception."
41. City Communications, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 650 F. Supp. 1570, 1576 (E.D.
Mich. 1987).
42. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
43. See Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 1987); City Commu-
nications, 650 F. Supp. at 1576-77.
44. See Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1985); cf. Hoover v.
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 580 (1984) (examination of the intent of state agency or commit-
tee "emasculate[s]" Parker doctrine); Scott v. City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207, 1216
(8th Cir. 1984) (" 'Ordinary' errors or abuses in the administration of jurisdiction con-
ferred by the state should be left for state tribunals to review.") (quoting P. Areeda,
Antitrust Law 212.3b, at 57 (Supp. 1982)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
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The Supreme Court already has stated that, for reasons of federalism,
there is no bad faith exception to the state action doctrine as applied to
the state acting as sovereign. 5 In Hoover v. Ronwin,4 the Court rejected
a rule that would have allowed antitrust plaintiffs "to look behind the
actions of state sovereigns and base their claims on perceived conspira-
cies to restrain trade among [those] who necessarily must advise the sov-
ereign" because such a rule would "emasculate the Parker v. Brown
doctrine."'47
This argument applies with equal force to nonsovereign bodies that
regulate commerce with the authority of the state, and the lower courts
that have rejected the bad faith exception rely substantially on the Hoo-
ver reasoning.4" For instance, in rejecting plaintiffs' argument that a bad
faith motivation vitiates state action immunity, the Ninth Circuit has
held that "[t]he availability of Parker immunity ... does not depend on
the subjective motivations of the individual actors, but rather on the sat-
isfaction of the objective standards set forth in Parker and authorities
which interpret it."'49 Once a state has chosen to regulate a market, fed-
eral antitrust laws must yield to state sovereignty.50
The policies underlying the state action doctrine itself defeat the disin-
genuous argument offered by one court choosing to uphold the bad faith
exception that it is "probable" that "the State would intend its munici-
palities to exercise their.., powers in a manner consistent with the
bounds imposed by the federal antitrust laws and the strong national pol-
45. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984). In Hoover, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the state action immunity of the Arizona Supreme Court in admitting attorneys
to the state bar. Id at 560. The Hoover Court held that "where the action complained
of-here the failure to admit [plaintiff] to the Bar-was that of the State itself, the action
is exempt from antitrust liability regardless of the State's motives in taking the action."
Id. at 579-80.
The Arizona Supreme Court admitted attorneys only after they had passed the bar
exam, which a committee appointed by the state supreme court administered and graded.
Id. at 561-63. The plaintiff alleged that the grading system employed by the committee
was designed to maintain a monopoly of lawyers in the state by restricting the number of
new entrants. Id at 565. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the state committee
itself was immune under Parker, however, because the Court found that the admission of
attorneys rested solely within the power of the Arizona Supreme Court, which was state
action immune. Id at 573-74.
46. 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
47. Id at 580; see Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34,44 n.7 (1985); see
also infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
48. See eg, Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 1987); City
Communications, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 650 F. Supp. 1570, 1576 (E.D. Mich. 1987); see
also Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1985) (state action immunity
analysis dependent upon subjective motivations "would compel the federal courts to in-
trude upon internal state affairs whenever a plaintiff could present colorable allegations of
bad faith"); Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992, 997 (3d Cir.) ('The state
action doctrine was developed to avoid... inquiry by federal courts into state legislative
wisdom."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1022 (1982).
49. Llewellyn, 765 F.2d at 774; see Boone v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of
San Jose, 841 F.2d 886, 892 (9th Cir. 1988).
50. See Boone, 841 F.2d at 890.
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icy favoring competition those laws embody. '"51 The entire body of state
action case law is intended to insure that when a municipality does not
act pursuant to a state policy to displace competition with regulation, it
must adhere to the federal antitrust laws.52
Despite these policies and the admonition in Hoover, courts following
the bad faith exception consistently find that a municipal ordinance en-
acted in keeping with the state action doctrine does not preclude inquiry
into the motive for official conduct when the plaintiff alleges bad faith.5 3
This conclusion, however, contravenes the principles underlying the
Hoover decision because the bad faith exception enables federal courts to
probe the subjective motivations of municipal actors to whom the state
has granted regulatory authority.54 Moreover, the majority of cases de-
cided since Hoover has recognized this limit on the power of federal
courts and has declined to examine the motives of officials acting under
an immune municipal ordinance.55
Nevertheless, proponents of the bad faith exception argue that when
municipal officials violate state criminal laws, it is manifest that the state
legislature has not "contemplated" the conduct, and therefore, under the
standard articulated in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
5 1. Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 743 (N.D.
Iowa 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
52. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 416 (1978)
(plurality opinion); see, e.g., Driscoll v. City of New York, 650 F. Supp. 1522, 1526-27
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (city's anticompetitive actions not immune because state statute provid-
ing for municipal regulation of waterfronts worded too broadly to evidence state anticom-
petitive policy).
53. See Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 746 (8th
Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir.
1981); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378, 379 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded
sub nor. City of Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated on remand, 576 F.2d 696
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); see also Fisichelli v. Town of Methuen,
653 F. Supp. 1494, 1500-01 (D. Mass. 1987) (although state statute clearly authorizes
municipality to issue industrial revenue bonds, alleged conspiracy to deny bonding to
protect municipal official's business is not immune); Oberndorf v. City and County of San
Francisco, 653 F. Supp. 304, 310 (D. Colo. 1986) ("A state agency's action is reviewable
if the state legislation authorizing the state action did not contemplate use of that authori-
zation to promote city or state officials' own interest and personal economic benefit.");
DiVerniero v. Murphy, 635 F. Supp. 1531, 1533 (D. Conn. 1986) (finding alleged con-
spiracy to harass street vendors not immune despite fact that statute clearly authorizes
anticompetitive vendor licensing ordinances); cf Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Co-
lumbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1444, 1446 (D.S.C. 1983) (court need not
consider whether state action immunity protects a municipal ordinance if plaintiff alleges
it was passed in bad faith).
54. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 574-75 (1984) (citing Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977)).
55. See Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 1987); Montauk-
Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
248 (1986); Hillman Flying Serv., Inc. v. City of Roanoke, 652 F. Supp. 1142, 1145-46
(W.D. Va. 1987); City Communications, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 650 F. Supp. 1570, 1576-
78 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Traweek v. City and County of San Francisco, 659 F. Supp. 1012,
1039 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (special master's findings).
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Co.,56 the state action doctrine is inapplicable.7 This argument proves
too much, however, because the doctrine of federalism requires that vio-
lations of state law be dealt with on the state level.58 Furthermore, ques-
tions of state government misconduct are not antitrust issues because
antitrust analysis inquires only into the economic ramifications of the act
in question.59 By permitting federal courts to investigate allegations of
local government misconduct under the guise of the state action doctrine,
the bad faith exception turns the federal courts into "superlegisla-
tures."'  In addition, the "contemplated" standard of Lafayette does not
require good faith as a component of municipal state action immunity,61
56. 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978) (plurality opinion).
57. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207, 1215 (8th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981); Fisichelli v.
Town of Methuen, 653 F. Supp. 1494, 1499 (D. Mass. 1987); Oberndorf v. City and
County of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304, 310 (D. Colo. 1986); Schiessle v. Stephens, 525 F.
Supp. 763, 776 (N.D. 11. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983);
Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029, at 76,330 (D. Colo.
1980); Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 744 (N.D.
Iowa 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982); see also P. Areeda &
H. Hovenkamp, supra note 15, t 212.3b, at 128 n.69 (presuming that state legislatures do
not contemplate clear violations of state law by municipal officials); Cirace, An Economic
Analysis of the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 481, 509-10 &
n.176 (1982) (municipal officials should be subject to the antitrust laws for activities such
as receiving bribes, kick-backs and influence peddling); Dabney, Antitrust Aspects of An-
ticompetitive Zoning, 24 Antitrust Bull. 435, 467 (1979) (state action doctrine should re-
quire local governments to exercise regulatory authority "to benefit the public, not
arbitrarily to benefit particular persons"); Ross, supra note 3 1, at 673 (municipal officials
should be subject to the antitrust laws when they act beyond traditional police power and
participate in illicit activities). But cf. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 580 & n.34
(1984) (mere challenges of improper motive on part of state supreme court committee
should not be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss); Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811
F.2d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 1987) (subjective motivations of public officals irrelevant to state
action immunity analysis); Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1985)
(same).
58. See Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 828 F.2d 514, 522 (9th Cir.
1987); Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1985); Chambers Dev. Co. v.
Municipality of Monroeville, 617 F. Supp. 820, 821-22 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
59. See, e.g., P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 15, 212.9b, at 152 (arguing
that even if bad faith allegations were proven, there "would simply be no antitrust of-
fense" in Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated
and remanded, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated on remand, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert
denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979)); id. at 212.9b, at 153 ("The heart of [complaints involving
allegations of bad faith conspiracies] ... is not an unreasonable restraint of trade, but
rather a local agency's abuse of power."); id. at 212.9d, at 155 ("conclusory [bad faith
conspiracy] allegations have kept litigation alive even though the court doubts seriously
that the plaintiff will be able to prove its allegations"); M. Lee, Antitrust Law and Local
Government 157-58 (1985) (municipal officials' "corruption, bias or stupidity" is irrele-
vant to the economic issues involved in an antitrust case); see also infra note 74 and
accompanying text; cf Chambers Dev. Co. v. Municipality of Monroeville, 617 F. Supp.
820, 822 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (that municipal state action is "later found to be preempted or
ineffective" does not subject the municipality to antitrust liability).
60. See M. Lee, supra note 59, at 34-35.
61. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 416-17
(1978) (plurality opinion) (Lafayette standard merely ensures that anticompetitive prac-
tices of municipalities are authorized by the state); City Communications, Inc. v. City of
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and there is little risk that a municipality will use its regulatory authority
in contravention of the "governmental interests of the State." 6
2
Although no longer needed to protect local governments from the
spectre of treble damages,63 the state action doctrine still serves to pro-
tect the state from the considerable burdens of litigation. The Hoover
Court denounced claims that challenge the motives of state officials be-
cause they are attendant with "substantial 'discovery and litigation bur-
dens.' " Thus, the bad faith exception emasculates the state action
doctrine because it entails the protracted litigation expense associated
with defending against "conclusory" 65 claims of conspiracy and bad
faith.66
Professor Areeda has pointed out three reasons why allegations of bad
faith conspiracies "deserve very little respect from the antitrust court. 67
First, a party displeased with the decision of a municipal body always is
Detroit, 650 F. Supp. 1570, 1577 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (contemplated standard of Lafayette
does not require good faith, but only a more than neutral expression of state legislative
intent to displace competition).
62. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985); see also Hancock
Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 235 (3d Cir. 1987) (relying on Hallie to reject the bad
faith exception).
63. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750
(1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. IV 1986)) eliminates the award of damages
in an antitrust suit against a municipality. See 15 U.S.C. § 35.
64. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 581 n.34 (1984) (quoting Areeda, supra note 9,
at 451); see Hancock, 811 F.2d at 234-35; City Communications, Inc. v. City of Detroit,
650 F. Supp. 1570,.1578 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
65. See Areeda, supra note 9, at 451-52.
66. See P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 15, 212.3, at 127; infra note 69 and
accompanying text. The case of Traweek v. City and County of San Francisco, 659 F.
Supp. 1012 (N.D. Cal. 1986), illustrates the unfairness of making municipalities defend
against claims of bad faith. In Traweek, the plaintiffs alleged that a conspiracy to elimi-
nate them from the condominium market existed between their competitors and city offi-
cials. Id. at 1017. The district court noted that the defendants probably satisfied the state
action requirements, but it denied their motion to dismiss because, if proven, the plain-
tiffs' "threadbare and largely conclusory" allegation of conspiracy would vitiate the state
action protection. Id. at 1020-21. Due to the complexity of the issues involved, the dis-
trict court appointed a special master, at $125 per hour (split between the parties), to
determine questions of fact including the allegations of bad faith. Id. at 1033-35.
Relying entirely upon Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1985) the special
master in Traweek concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations of bad faith were irrelevant to
the claim. Traweek, 659 F. Supp. at 1039. The special master then recommended that
the court grant the defendants' pending motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1042 (spe-
cial master's findings). Accordingly, the district court adopted the special master's find-
ings, which noted that the court's prior holding had been made under confusion of the
existing precedent. Id. at 1037-38. The district court could have avoided the lengthy
proceeding, as well as the expense to the municipality of defending against the plaintiffs'
"conclusory" claim of conspiracy, had it recognized at the outset that bad faith is not an
element of state action immunity analysis.
67. Areeda, supra note 9, at 452; see, P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 15,
212.3b, at 126-27. Professor Areeda's argument clearly would prevent litigation of the
vast majority of bad faith claims that deal with allegations of conspiracy, see supra note
34, and, as he has noted, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits appear to have adopted his
position, see supra note 39. See P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 15, 1 212.3b, at
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tempted to claim that the decision resulted from a conspiracy against
him.68 Second, the conclusory nature of these claims renders it unlikely
that they will be proved in fact.69 Third, the threat of these claims has a
chilling effect on the operation of government bodies. 70
Moreover, because almost any economic action taken by a municipal-
ity can be shown to have a legitimate governmental purpose,7" if the al-
leged bad faith conduct benefits the municipality, the problems attendant
upon proving that a municipality acted solely to harm the plaintiff are
heightened.
B. Other Remedies Offer Adequate Protection Against Corruption in
Local Government
Conduct that satisfies the requirements of state action immunity never-
theless may violate state criminal laws, anticorruption laws, or such fed-
eral laws as the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
("RICO")' 2 and the Civil Rights Act of 187l."3 Such reprehensible con-
128. There is some indication, however, that he has not resolved whether conduct that
clearly violates state law also deserves immunity. See id. at 128 n.69.
This Note argues that such conduct, which constitutes only a small number of the bad
faith claims by plaintiffs, see supra note 34, should not be the subject of an exception to
municipal state action immunity because of the availability of forums better suited to the
regulation of such conduct, the practical difficulties associated with defending claims of
bad faith, and most important the policy reasons articulated by the Hoover Court.
68. See P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 15, 212.3b, at 128 n.169. Professor
Areeda specifically mentions the following cases as examples of this problem: Corey v.
Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded sub nom. City of Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated on
remand, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); and Stauffer v.
Town of Grand Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029, at 76,330 (D. Colo. 1980). See
Areeda, supra note 9, at 450-51; see also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 580 (1984)
(noting the temptation for parties who disagree with decisions of state agencies to bring
unfounded actions).
69. See Areeda, supra note 9, at 452. For example, in Oberndorf v. City and County
of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304 (D. Colo. 1986), the court admitted that plaintiffs, private
property owners, would have extreme difficulty proving the alleged conspiracy between
municipal officials and a private developer to condemn plaintiffs' property and then con-
vey it to the private developers. See id at 309. The court nevertheless denied the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss because it found that, if proven, the conspiracy would have been
outside the city's state-granted authority. See id at 3 10.
70. See Areeda, supra note 9, at 452; see also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,
471 U.S. 34, 44 (1985); Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 1985); Scott v.
City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207, 1215 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003
(1985); H.R. Rep. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 4602, 4612.
71. See H.R. Rep. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 4602, 4609.
72. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See, eg., United States v.
Angelli, 660 F.2d 23, 33 (2d Cir. 1981) (Congress clearly intended RICO to apply to
corruption in local government); Massey v. City of Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81, 85
(W.D. Okla. 1986) (municipal officals acting ultra vires are proper RICO defendants, but
municipality itself is not).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). For a discussion of municipal liability under § 1983, see
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duct on the part of public officials, however, may have no bearing on
state action immunity or the antitrust laws.74 The availability of these
alternative remedies removes the need for plaintiffs to rely on antitrust
claims to vindicate their rights.75
For example, in Chambers Development Co. v. Municipality of
Monroeville,7 6 the plaintiff alleged that the municipality in which the
plaintiff owned a landfill site had entered into a conspiracy against the
plaintiff to conduct a sham bidding procedure for a garbage disposal con-
tract.77 The plaintiff claimed that this alleged conspiracy violated RICO
as well as the Sherman Act.7" The court dismissed the plaintiff's anti-
trust claim against the municipality, holding that the conduct was "fore-
seeable" and the fact that it later was found to be "preempted or
Note, A Foreseeability-Based Standard for the Determination of Municipal Liability
Under Section 1983, 28 B.C.L. Rev. 937 (1987).
74. See M. Lee, supra note 59, at 35, 157-58; see also supra note 58 and accompanying
text. DiVerniero v. Murphy, 635 F. Supp. 1531 (D. Conn. 1986), provides a noteworthy
example of egregious bad faith conduct mistakenly held to amount to anticompetitive
conduct. In DiVerniero, the plaintiff alleged that municipal officials and the holder of an
exclusive vendor contract in the city coliseum had conspired illegally to hire off-duty
police officers to harass and intimidate street vendors in the area of the coliseum. Id. at
1532. The plaintiff claimed that as a result of these activities, he had to close the portion
of his gas station business that sold food and novelties to coliseum patrons. Id.
In rejecting the defendants' state action immunity defense, the DiVerniero court held
that the alleged conspiracy was not the type of "anticompetitive" conduct contemplated
by the state legislature. Id. at 1537. The Court also held, however, that the city had the
power to grant and enforce the exclusive vendor contract and to regulate the business of
street vending. Id. Given this conclusion, the correct state action question should have
been whether the municipality's state-granted regulatory authority logically would result
in the elimination of street vendors as a source of competition with the coliseum. Phrased
in this way, the issue of whether the challenged conduct was legal or illegal under state
law, in good or bad faith, would be irrelevant to the issue of whether the municipality was
state action immune: the only inquiry should be whether the anticompetitive result of the
municipality's actions was foreseeable given the regulatory authority conferred by the
state legislature. For a description of the correct approach, see Traweek v. City and
County of San Francisco, 659 F. Supp. 1012, 1039-40 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (special master's
findings).
For other cases in which courts have mischaracterized bad faith conduct as anticompe-
titive conduct and erroneously found that state action immunity did not attach, see
Fisichelli v. Town of Methuen, 653 F. Supp. 1494, 1499 (D. Mass. 1987); Oberndorf v.
City and County of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304, 309-10 (D. Colo. 1986); Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1444, 1446-47
(D.S.C. 1983).
75. See Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1985); Chambers Dev. Co.
v. Municipality of Monroeville, 617 F. Supp. 820, 822 (W.D. Pa. 1985); H.R. Rep. No.
965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4602,
4611; Areeda, supra note 9, at 454-55; M. Lee, supra note 59, at 164 n.46.
In addition, local government always remains ultimately accountable to the electorate.
See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 n.9 (1985); H.R. Rep. No. 965,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4602, 4610;
M. Lee, supra note 59, at 164 n.46.
76. 617 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
77. Id. at 822.
78. Id. at 821. The plaintiff also alleged violations of the civil rights laws and various
state laws. Id. at 821-22.
[Vol. 56
STATE ACTION ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
ineffective" did not alter the municipality's state action immunity." The
court, however, denied the municipality's motion to dismiss the plain-
tiff's RICO allegations.80
C. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 Does Not Support the
Bad Faith Exception
Last, an argument in favor of the bad faith exception based on the
Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984,"1 which eliminates antitrust
damage awards against a municipality82 when municipal officials act in
"an official capacity,"83 is destined to fail. Congress has stated that the
Act does not change the substantive law of the state action doctrine."
Although no court has yet relied upon the Act as the basis for a bad faith
exception to state action immunity,"5 at least one court has stated ex-
pressly that this provision does not create a bad faith exception to state
action immunity. 6 It reasoned that Congress' purpose in passing the
Act was to extend, not to restrict, municipal immunity.7
CONCLUSION
The bad faith exception to state action antitrust immunity of munici-
palities ignores the doctrine of federalism that forms the basis of the state
action doctrine. The Supreme Court already has stated that the bad faith
79. Id at 822. The court also noted as a reason not to restrict application of the state
action doctrine that the "[p]laintiff has in the past effectively used state court remedies to
challenge improper municipal actions found to be in conflict with the state's extensive
regulatory pattern over waste collection and disposal." Id,
80. Id at 824.
81. Pub. L. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. IV
1986)).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 35.
83. Id This argument would be based on statements in the legislative history of the
Act to the effect that it does not apply in cases where municipal officials have acted in a
criminal capacity. See H.R. Rep. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4602, 4621 ("The definition of official conduct allows room
for good faith errors by local government officials in conducting the public business.
Conduct falls within the definition if the actor 'could reasonably have construed' his ac-
tions to be within the authority of the local government."); id at 20, reprinted in 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 4621 ("[P]articipation in criminal acts, or other
behavior clearly falling outside a local government's authority, would fall outside the
definition of official conduct.") (citing Affiliated Capitol Corp. v. City of Houston, 735
F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1053 (1985)).
84. See H.R. Rep. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4602, 4603, 4620.
85. See, e.g., Fisichelli v. Town of Methuen, 653 F. Supp. 1494, 1500-01 (D. Mass.
1987) (instead basing exception on facts in Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (Ist Cir. 1981));
Oberndorf v. City and County of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304, 310 (D. Colo. 1986) (instead
basing the exception on "contemplated" standard of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
86. See Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 107 S. Ct. 248 (1986).
87. See id at 94.
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exception is inconsistent with the principles of federalism by holding that
the subjective motivations of individual actors are irrelevant to state ac-
tion immunity when the state acts as sovereign. On the local level, an
analysis that requires courts to intrude into the intent of local govern-
ment officials acting pursuant to state authority emasculates the state ac-
tion doctrine itself. The bad faith exception exacerbates this problem
because it forces municipalities that otherwise have satisfied state action
criteria to wage costly defenses against complex and difficult-to-prove
claims of bad faith. Therefore, the federal courts that have upheld the
bad faith exception should eliminate this element from state action im-
munity analysis and leave claims of bad faith for the state courts and
political processes to determine.
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